I - ESCAPING THE COMMON LAW’S SHADOW - PERCIVAL.DOC

04/25/01 9:34 AM

ESCAPING THE COMMON LAW’S SHADOW:
STANDING IN THE LIGHT OF LAIDLAW
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL* AND JOANNA B. GOGER**
INTRODUCTION
The case poses—if only we choose to reach them—significant
aspects of a wide, growing, and disturbing problem, that is, the
Nation’s and the world’s deteriorating environment with its
resulting ecological disturbances. Must our law be so rigid and our
procedural concepts so inflexible that we render ourselves helpless
when the existing methods and the traditional concepts do not quite
1
fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate for new issues?

Justice Blackmun’s complaint, voiced nearly three decades ago in
2
Sierra Club v. Morton, reflected the difficulty the legal system then
was having in adapting to burgeoning public concern for the
environment. At the time it decided Morton, the Supreme Court had
just begun to open up the courts to the beneficiaries of new federal
regulatory programs, discarding the common law notion that only the
targets of regulation could suffer “legal wrong” entitling them to seek
judicial redress.3 Morton represented a significant step forward
because a majority of the Court expressly acknowledged that injuries
to aesthetic and environmental interests were judicially cognizable
even when those interests were “shared by the many rather than the
few. . . .”4 But the Court also held that the Sierra Club lacked
standing to challenge construction of a ski resort in a national game
refuge in the Mineral King Valley of the Sierra Nevada Mountains,
giving rise to Justice Blackmun’s complaint.5 The Court’s holding
ultimately did not pose a significant barrier to environmental interests
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1. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755-56 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
3. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
4. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
5. See id. at 735-36.
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seeking judicial redress, because it was based on the Sierra Club’s
failure to allege how its interests would be adversely affected. On
remand the Sierra Club easily established standing by alleging that its
members regularly visited the Mineral King area.6
Liberalized standing, coupled with citizen-suit provisions in
newly-enacted regulatory legislation, provided citizens with
significant legal tools for ensuring that national environmental
programs were implemented and enforced during the 1970s and early
1980s. However, in subsequent years standing jurisprudence traveled
a more twisted path, much like the road that today still provides the
7
only motorized access to Mineral King. At the behest of Justice
Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court resurrected private law notions of
standing to limit access to courts by environmental interests.8 By
insisting that plaintiffs make detailed showings of individualized,
causal injury in order to establish standing, the Court made it more
difficult for citizens to bring suits to enforce the environmental laws.9
Justice Scalia’s vision of standing, founded on an undisguised hostility
toward the purposes of the environmental laws,10 reinjected into
citizen suits the very kind of factual inquiries about individualized
injury that had rendered the common law inadequate to protect
against environmental harm.11 In January 2000, the Supreme Court
abruptly repudiated this vision with its decision in Friends of the
12
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.
This paper discusses the impact of Laidlaw on citizen suits to
enforce environmental standards. It argues that Laidlaw is best
understood not as having worked a fundamental change in standing
doctrine, but rather as a rejection of the extreme consequences of
6. On remand from the Supreme Court the Sierra Club was able to amend its complaint
to establish standing by alleging that its members regularly visit the area where the ski resort
would be built. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE & POLICY 1037 (3d ed. 2000).
7. See id. at 1037-38.
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432 (1988).
9. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (requiring allegations of use
and injury to specific tracts of more than 1,200 parcels of land subject to disposition by the
Bureau of Land Management); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (requiring
purchase of plane tickets to visit endangered wildlife abroad).
10. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
11. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1433-36 (arguing that “under this model, a nineteenth
century private right is a predicate for judicial intervention; as a result, courts may not redress
the systemic or probabilistic harms that Congress intended regulatory schemes to prevent”).
12. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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employing a private law model in assessing litigants’ standing.
Laidlaw returns standing jurisprudence to a model more consistent
with the realities of the modern regulatory state. This paper
concludes that, at least in the context of citizen enforcement actions,
standing doctrine serves as a useful vehicle for ensuring that litigants
have some connection to the resources or the community sought to be
protected by the public laws they seek to enforce. As a result of
Laidlaw, citizens who live near sources of pollution or who recreate in
areas affected by violations of environmental law may sue to enforce
the laws without having to demonstrate observable impacts of the
illegal acts.
Part I of this paper traces the early evolution of standing
doctrine. Part II examines why the rise of national regulatory
legislation made a private law model of standing inappropriate for
rationing citizen access to courts. Part III traces Justice Scalia’s
campaign to reinject private law concepts into standing analysis. Part
IV discusses how Laidlaw repudiates this vision and Part V explores
the implications of Laidlaw for the future of citizen suits to enforce
environmental laws.
I. THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF STANDING DOCTRINE
Standing to sue is a fairly recent concept in American
13
jurisprudence, as several scholars have noted. “Standing,” which is
not mentioned in the Constitution, was not discussed in the context of
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement until 1944, and it was
not until the 1970s that standing doctrine became widely used in the
federal courts.14 Courts traditionally focused on whether a litigant
15
had a cause of action under principles of common law or by statute.
While most early private actions were based on common law, some
statutes created private rights of action, including statutes authorizing
13. See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis J. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269-82 (1961); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-97 (1992);
Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1371, 1394-1425 (1988).
14. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 169. Professor Sunstein cites Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288 (1944), as the first case to discuss the concept of standing in the Article III context, and
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), as the
case that first employed the “injury in fact”concept in assessing whether a plaintiff was within
the “zone of interests” protected by a statute.
15. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 170 (“Without a cause of action, there was no case or
controversy and hence no standing.”).
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qui tam or informers’ actions. Qui tam statutes allowed citizens to
bring civil suits against private parties for violations of federal laws;
informers’ actions could be brought against both public officials and
private parties to enforce public duties.16 Successful plaintiffs were
allowed to keep a portion of the resulting recoveries or fines.
Standing first emerged as a distinct legal concept during the New
Deal period as courts struggled to digest a flood of new regulatory
17
legislation. Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter sought to “insulate
progressive and New Deal legislation from frequent judicial attack”
by invoking justiciability doctrines, including what is known now as
18
standing, to bar challenges to the legislation. The opinions from this
time period continued to assert that a plaintiff must have some legal
right, whether by common law or statute, to bring a cause of action in
19
federal court. Thus, this original private law model was transferred
to a public law setting, and only those parties to whom the
government had breached a duty had standing to sue.20 These
included “objects” of regulation whose common law liberty and
property rights had the potential to be affected by overzealous
regulation. This model, however, did not confer standing on
beneficiaries of regulation whose common law interests were not
cognizably injured.
Erosion of the private law model of standing began in 1940 when
the Supreme Court upheld the right of a competing radio station to
21
challenge implementation of a national regulatory statute. In FCC
22
v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, the Court conferred standing upon a
competitor of a radio station who did not have a legal injury
protected at common law but who nonetheless was a party “aggrieved
16. See id. at 173-178.
17. See id. at 179.
18. See id.
19. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939)
(finding that the plaintiff must have a “legal right,—one of property, one arising out of contract,
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege”);
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1438. Sunstein argues that the private model of standing was a
culmination of two seemingly adverse viewpoints. A belief in the superiority of common law
rights of freedom of liberty, property, and contract over rights conferred by social regulation
was grounded in the Lochner era and its accompanying rejection of state and federal statutes.
On the other hand, as New Deal legislation was passed and judges began to invoke the
illegitimacy of the Lochner era in their rulings, the Court sought to use standing as a means of
insulating legislation from review. Thus, both supporters and opponents of the regulatory state
sought to limit standing to those with common law interests at stake.
20. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1435.
21. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 6.
22. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).

I - ESCAPING THE COMMON LAW’S SHADOW - PERCIVAL.DOC

Fall 2001]

ESCAPING THE COMMON LAW’S SHADOW

04/25/01 9:34 AM

123

or whose interests are adversely affected” as defined in the statute
under which he sought review.23 Furthermore, the statute under
which he sought review, the Communications Act of 1934, had as its
purpose the protection of the public’s interest in adequate
communications service.24 This decision established a precedent for
standing by the beneficiaries of regulatory legislation designed to
vindicate public interests.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), enacted in 1946,
provided a codification of the categories of standing that had
25
The APA
previously been articulated by the federal courts.
provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of the relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
26
thereof.” The APA recognizes that a citizen suffering a legal wrong
could bring suit while also recognizing that Congress could authorize
a cause of action even though no “legal wrong” had been suffered.27
The Court’s interpretation of the “legal wrong” requirement was
extended beyond mere objects of regulation to encompass
beneficiaries of regulations in the 1960s, signaling an even more
significant abandonment of a model of standing grounded in the
28
common law. This development significantly broadened standing
doctrine in the regulatory context, as standing had previously been
conferred only upon those whose common-law property and liberty
interests were affected by overzealous regulation.29 As a result,
beneficiaries of regulation whose interests had previously been
23. See id. at 477. The Court concluded that “[i]t is within the power of Congress to confer
such standing to prosecute an appeal.”
24. See id. at 475-76.
25. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 181.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
27. See id.
28. See Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 414 F.2d 1125, 1134
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (“Various decisions recognize the broad principles of standing applicable to
consumers of a service under regulatory control.”); Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 359 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(adopting the Supreme Court’s reasoning in FCC v. Sanders and concluding that “unless the
listeners . . . can be heard, there may be no one to bring programming deficiencies or offensive
overcommercialization to the attention of the Commission in an effective manner”); Bebchick v.
Public Utils. Comm’n, 287 F.2d 337, 338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (finding that public transit rider had
standing to appeal a rate increase); Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F.
Supp. 742, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (conferring standing upon citizens to challenge housing
program).
29. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1439-40 (noting that denial of judicial review to
regulatory objects would have constitutional ramifications).
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considered as “privileges or legal gratuities, . . . to be vindicated
through the political process or not at all” would have standing to
30
sue. This enabled citizens frustrated by the failure of government
agencies to address rising environmental concerns to seek judicial
redress.31
The common law underpinnings of standing doctrine were
substantially altered by the Supreme Court’s 1970 opinion in
32
Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp. In this
case, the Court “signal[ed] a departure from the private-law
underpinnings of previous law.”33 In so doing, the Court abandoned
its focus on a cognizable legal interest and shifted the focus of the
inquiry to a determination of whether the interest is “arguably within
the zone of interests” of the statute.34 This stemmed from a
realization that “whether A has violated a duty to B does not quite
capture the dynamics of public-law cases, in which disputes cannot so
readily be understood in terms of clear rights and duties.”35 Although
it appeared that the Court was finally adapting standing doctrine to
the realities of the administrative state by abandoning its reliance on
the existence of a concrete legal interest, the adoption of an “injury in
fact” requirement shifted the focus of the inquiry from a legal to a
factual one. This left the door open for reinjecting private law
notions into standing analysis when courts later insisted on
increasingly detailed demonstrations of individualized, causal injury.36
This new focus for standing doctrine initially proved to be
relatively unproblematic for environmental plaintiffs. To be sure,
37
when it lost in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club failed in its
gambit to acquire automatic standing in environmental cases by
dispensing with any allegations of how it would be injured. However,
30. See id. at 1436, 1442. See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093,
1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Consumers of regulated products and services have standing to protect
the public interest in the proper administration of a regulatory system enacted for their
benefit.”).
31. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 183; see also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v.
Federal Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 615-617 (2d Cir. 1965) (“In order to ensure that the
Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest . . . those who by their
activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be
included in the class of ‘aggrieved’ parties . . . .”).
32. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
33. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1445.
34. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
35. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1446.
36. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 190-91.
37. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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the Court’s recognition that aesthetic interests are judicially
cognizable for purposes of standing, even when shared by many,
made it relatively easy for bona fide environmental groups to
establish standing. The Court’s subsequent decision in United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)38
seemed to confirm that the injury in fact test would be very easy to
satisfy even with an allegation of an “attenuated line of causation.”
In SCRAP, environmentally concerned law students alleged that a
freight rate increase would harm them by discouraging the use of
recycled materials leading to increased litter and resource
consumption. The Court held this sufficient to give the students
standing to challenge a federal agency’s decision to approve the rate
increase.
II. THE RISE OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
As standing doctrine continued to evolve, Congress responded to
public concern for the environment by enacting far-reaching national
environmental legislation during the decade of the 1970s. The first of
39
these statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
sought to require federal agencies to incorporate consideration of
environmental concerns into their decision-making processes.
Responding to an early claim that a federal agency was violating
NEPA, Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright predicted that the judiciary
would play a major role in determining whether the wave of new
environmental legislation would achieve its promises. He emphasized
that it was the duty of courts “to see that important legislative
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or
misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”40
Litigation to enforce NEPA was brought under the judicial
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, the very
vehicle the Sierra Club used to gain access to court when it sought to
block Disney’s Mineral King project. As noted above, the APA
allows a person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute” to seek judicial review.
Shortly after enacting NEPA, Congress responded to an outpouring
of environmental concern by creating national regulatory programs,
including the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. These laws
38. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
40. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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represented a dramatic shift toward precautionary regulation that
sought to overcome the deficiencies of the common law in protecting
41
the environment.
Recognizing the difficulty of getting government bureaucracies
to respond to environmental concerns, Congress sought to enlist the
public in the task of ensuring that the new legislation was
implemented and enforced. Beginning with the Clean Air Act in
1970, virtually all of the major federal environmental statutes
42
included their own citizen suit and judicial review provisions. These
generally authorize citizens to sue both government officials who fail
to perform non-discretionary duties and private parties who violate
the statutes.43 By providing express rights of action that the
beneficiaries of regulation could use to ensure that statutes were
44
implemented and enforced, Congress hoped to end the well-known
41. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 15, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that the
precautionary nature of the Clean Air Act “would seem to demand that regulatory action
precede, and, optimally, prevent” harm and therefore courts should “not demand rigorous stepby-step proof of cause and effect” because “[s]uch proof may be impossible to obtain if the
precautionary purpose of the statute is to be served”) (emphasis in original); City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) (finding that the Clean Water Act preempted the federal
common law of nuisance, whose application had been “peculiarly inappropriate in areas as
complex as water pollution control”).
42. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994);
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Air Pollution Prevention
and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659
(1994). See also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1056-57 (explaining that Congress enacted a
citizen-suit provision as part of virtually every major environmental law except the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994)).
43. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1056-57.
44. Citizen-suit provisions in some environmental laws broadly authorize suits by “any
person.” See, e.g., ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994). For purposes of the ESA, “person” is
defined as “an individual, corporation, partnership, . . . or any officer, employee, agent,
department or instrumentality of the Federal Government . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).
The citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act contains slightly different language. The
statute authorizes “any citizen” to file suit, as opposed to “any person.” See Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). A “citizen” is defined as “a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994). The legislative history
demonstrates that this definition was meant to reflect the interpretation adopted in the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Morton. See Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act
Standing in Light of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169, 175 (1997)
(citing the Senate Conference Committee report for its conclusion that “the definition of the
term ‘citizen’ reflects the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Sierra Club v.
Morton.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 3776, 3823).
Furthermore, by adopting this definition the Committee intended that injuries to aesthetic,
noneconomic interests could also serve as the basis for a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act.
See Coplan, supra, at 172-75.
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tendency for regulatory agencies to become captives of the industries
they regulate.45 The notion that the more diffuse interests of the
public who were beneficiaries of regulation were worthy of judicial
protection was an important development for a modern regulatory
state that sought to protect the environment, consumers, and the
46
poor. The environmental laws that were passed beginning in the
1970s were a reflection of the goals of the modern regulatory state,
which included a desire to protect public values. Thus, environmental
law developed as a form of “social regulation,” designed to improve
society as a whole rather than focusing on the needs of particular
individuals.47
As noted above, citizen suits had long been a part of English and
American legal practice. English courts conferred broad standing on
citizens to bring public actions through the use of the writs of
48
prohibition, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
These writs could be used by “strangers” to the action who may not
have been able to allege a concrete interest that was adversely
affected, but who instead had an interest in securing a “public right.”49
In particular, the writ of mandamus could be used to compel
50
government officials to perform a duty required by law.

45. See JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION 60-61 (1970) (arguing that mission-oriented administrative agencies had been
notoriously unresponsive to the public to the detriment of environmental concerns).
46. See Sunstein, supra note, 13, at 187. See also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1444 (“This
conclusion was a natural—indeed inevitable—outgrowth of the New Deal, which arose from a
belief that the common-law catalogue of interests was inadequate.”).
47. See MARK SAGOFF, ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 1 (1988) (defining social regulation as
the governmental initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s designed to afford protection to the
environment, workplace safety, consumer product safety, and housing and employment
equality).
48. See George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in
Environmental Cases, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,028, 10,029 (1999). Van Cleve defines “public
actions” as “those actions where the plaintiff’s claim is not founded on a traditional commonlaw private right” but rather on “rights belonging to the public generally . . . .” Id. at 10,029 n.8.
In addition to the prerogative writs, the English courts also allowed citizens to bring public
actions through the use of informers’ actions and relator actions. See id. at 10,030-31. These
actions could be brought against private individuals and public officials who violated their
duties. See id. See also Sunstein, supra note 13, at 171-72.
49. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875) (finding that there is “a
decided preponderance of American authority in favor of the doctrine, that private persons may
move for a mandamus to enforce a public duty, . . . without the intervention of the government
law-officer”).
50. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 172.
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While these writs were used only infrequently in the United
51
States, early Congresses created numerous qui tam actions. Qui tam
actions give citizens the right to bring civil suits against violators of
certain federal laws.52 For example, the False Claims Act53 authorizes
qui tam actions by citizens against persons who knowingly present
54
false or fraudulent claims to the government. Under the Act, the qui
tam relator can receive a percentage of the proceeds of the
government’s recovery.55 Qui tam actions provide further support for
Congress’ ability to confer standing through citizen-suit provisions
without violating Article III of the Constitution.56 They also provide
51. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943) (“Qui tam suits have
been frequently permitted by legislative action, and have not been without defense by the
courts.”)(italics added).
52. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 175 (noting that qui tam actions were authorized under
many statutes, including statutes involving illegal importation of liquor, trade with Indian tribes,
and illegal slave trading).
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
54. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994) (authorizing “[a] person [to] bring a civil action for a
violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States government. The action shall
be brought in the name of the Government”).
55. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1994). The Supreme Court avoided the question whether the
11th Amendment bars a qui tam action brought against a state agency to enforce the False
Claims Act by holding that a state is not a “person” for purposes of qui tam liability. See
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).
The Court reversed a second circuit decision that held that qui tam actions against state agencies
are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because they are actions brought to vindicate the
rights of the United States, and not the rights of the private individual bringing the suit.
Standing had been challenged in several cases brought under the False Claims Act. Several
courts had held that the citizen plaintiff automatically derives standing as a representative of the
government who is the real party in interest. Others had relied on the theory that the financial
interest acquired by the citizen plaintiff through the specific provisions of the FCA confers
standing. This argument found support in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 106-07 (1998) (suggesting that civil penalties might satisfy
the redressability requirement for standing if they were payable to the plaintiff), and Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (distinguishing citizen suits from qui tam actions
in which “Congress has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a
private party for the government’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious
plaintiff”). In Vermont Agency, the Court upheld the standing of the plaintiffs to bring qui tam
actions based on the theory that the injury in fact suffered by the federal government confers
standing on them as assignees of the government’s claim. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia
disputed the notion that the financial interest of the relator could serve as a sufficient basis for
standing, equating it with the interest of “someone who has placed a wager on the outcome” of
the litigation. Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he interest must consist of obtaining compensation
for, or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right,” though he acknowledged that
Congress may be able to define new legal rights that would “confer standing to vindicate an
injury caused to the claimant.” Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1862.
56. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 177-78. Sunstein argues that “[t]here is absolutely no
affirmative evidence that Article III intended to limit congressional power to create standing.”
Id.
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strong support for the use of citizen suits against private defendants
because qui tam actions historically were brought against private
57
parties.
Congress added citizen-suit provisions to virtually all the major
federal environmental laws to ensure that they were implemented
and enforced. The regulatory legislation adopted in the 1970s sought
to address environmental risks capable of affecting large groups of
people and vast stretches of the natural environment. The common
law was not well suited to addressing these risks, as the common law
of trespass and nuisance tended to focus on discrete, individualized
injuries rather than broad-based environmental harms. Furthermore,
in keeping with the purpose of providing broad based protection to
the environment, several environmental statutes, such as the Clean
Water Act, explicitly focus on systemic, rather than singular
environmental harms.58
The Clean Water Act was passed in 1972 in response to
legislative findings that demonstrated that a large portion of the
nation’s waterways were severely polluted and that the federal
program in place to control water pollution was “inadequate in every
59
vital aspect.” The Act sought to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”60 by enacting
a system of technology-based limits on dischargers and a national
permit program to limit discharges of water pollutants by individual
sources.61 It prohibits all unpermitted discharges into navigable
waters, without requiring any showing that the discharge will harm
receiving waters.62 “Whereas the previous scheme required proof of
actual injury to a body of water to establish a violation, Congress now
63
instituted a regime of strict liability for illegal pollutant discharges.”
Thus, the Act sought to largely displace the common law’s unwieldly
causation and harm requirements with a regulatory system more
suited to systemic environmental problems.
57. See id. at 176.
58. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994); Federal
Land Management and Policy Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
59. See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674.
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
61. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 6, at 639.
62. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994) (making it unlawful for a person to discharge any
pollutant). See also Coplan, supra note 44, at 175-76 (noting that the Clean Water Act’s
prohibition on discharge of pollutants sets up a “strict liability” regime).
63. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
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In the 1970s, citizens suits were used primarily as an “actionforcing device” against agencies that had failed to perform duties
mandated by the environmental laws. They were rarely invoked to
64
sue private parties who were in violation of the laws’ requirements.
Beginning in the early 1980s, this private enforcement mechanism
proved to be a successful method of enforcing the law against private
parties for violations of NPDES (National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System) permits.65 These violations were easy to prove
by studying the permittees discharge monitoring reports (DMRs),
reports that companies are required to keep and which are available
for public review.66
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act, the first
environmental statute to contain a citizen-suit provision, confirms
that Congress recognized the importance of citizen enforcement,
stating that “[g]overnment initiative in seeking enforcement under
the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring
suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental
agencies charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and
abatement proceedings.”67
Citizen enforcement actions were designed to “supplement
68
rather than to supplant governmental action.” Thus, citizen
enforcement actions, as contemplated by Congress when it enacted
citizen-suit provisions, serve as a check and balance on government
enforcement efforts.69 Both the federal and state governments have
64. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1057.
65. See id. The first compilation of citizen enforcement data was produced by the
Environmental Law Institute in 1984. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SUITS:
AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES
(1984). The study relied on notices of intent to sue sent to EPA headquarters and regional
offices, interviews, as well as case reporters, and periodicals. See id. at II-2. The study
concluded that a marked increase in the number of citizen suits brought occurred beginning in
1982, particularly under the Clean Water Act. See Jeffrey Miller, Private Enforcement of
Federal Environmental Pollution Control Laws, Part III, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,407, 10,424-25
(1984). The study found that most notices of intent to sue involved alleged violations of the
Clean Water Act. See id. See also infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing the
relative ease of bringing these suits); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34
BUFF. L. REV. 833, 870-72 (1985).
66. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1057.
67. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356.
68. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60
(1987).
69. See Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1322 (7th
Cir. 1992) (suggesting that citizen-suit provisions serve as “goads to both the EPA and polluters
without displacing the federal agency as the principal enforcer”).
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been openly supportive of the citizen enforcement role, as evidenced
by the government’s filing of amicus briefs in some citizen suits.70 In
fact, the legislative history of RCRA’s citizen-suit provision shows
that Congress sought to encourage government agencies to file
amicus briefs in citizen suits to promote consistency in enforcement.71
Furthermore, government agencies support citizen enforcement
action in circumstances where the government lacks the resources to
respond to a violation.72 The EPA acknowledges that its enforcement
73
efforts can target only the most significant dischargers.
III. THE RESURRECTION OF A PRIVATE LAW MODEL OF STANDING
The Supreme Court’s decisions liberalizing standing doctrine
opened the doors to citizen enforcement action to protect the
environment. Beginning in 1990, however, the Court began to chip
away at citizens’ ability to sue to protect the environment, leading the
lower federal courts to apply a much more restrictive standing
framework in citizen enforcement actions.
A. Competing Visions of the Role of Citizen Suits
Efforts to restrict the standing of environmental plaintiffs have
been championed by critics of citizen suits who argued that citizen
suits are improper or illegitimate, despite their long tradition in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Some of the more extreme critics
have argued that citizen plaintiffs are seeking to infringe on the
70. The United States filed amicus briefs on behalf of the appeals of Friends of the Earth in
the Fourth Circuit’s consideration of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000), and during the
Supreme Court’s review of the decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998). See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 188 n.4 (2000). In its
decision in Laidlaw, the Court referred to the federal government’s filing of amicus briefs to
support the notion that the Executive Branch does not believe that citizen suits encroach on its
ability to enforce the law. See id. See also David Hodas, Enforcement in a Triangular Federal
System, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1576 (1995) (discussing the EPA’s public recognition of the
importance of citizen enforcement).
71. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-198, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.
72. See id. (noting that expansion of the RCRA citizen-suit provision “will complement
rather than conflict with, the Administrator’s efforts . . . particularly where the Government is
unable to take action because of inadequate resources”); see also Dale D. Buss, New waves of
lawsuits: Business’ decks are awash with environmental accusations, CORP. REP. WIS., Sept.
1993, at 28 (quoting a Wisconsin assistant state’s attorney who acknowledged the “‘strong need
for . . . citizen groups to bring actions” in light of limited state budgets).
73. See ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT
FY98, EPA 300-R-99-003, at 8 (June 1999) (“OECA’s first objective envisions a targeted effort
to reduce significant noncompliance (SNC) in high priority areas. . . .”).
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property rights of defendants, ignoring the fact that citizen suits may
only be brought to require implementation of non-discretionary
duties or enforcement of existing regulatory requirements. While
others portray citizen-suit plaintiffs as primarily motivated by the
prospects for obtaining attorneys’ fees awards, they ignore the fact
74
that attorneys’ fees may only be obtained by successful litigants,
which virtually guarantees that repeat plaintiffs will not be fully
compensated for their efforts.
What appears to be at the root of most criticisms of citizen
enforcement actions is deep hostility toward the underlying laws that
citizens seek to enforce. This was quite evident in a 1983 law review
article by then Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia argued
that the standing doctrine was a “critical and inseparable element” of
separation of powers principles that should be more rigidly
interpreted by the courts to reduce judicial intrusion into the
75
operations of the other branches. What is remarkable about this
article is Justice Scalia’s expression of hostility toward enforcement of
the environmental laws. Scalia argued that judges who enforce
environmental laws are “likely (despite the best of intentions) to be
76
enforcing the political prejudices of their own class.” He explained
that “[t]heir greatest success in such an enterprise—ensuring strict
enforcement of the environmental laws . . . met with approval in the
classrooms of Cambridge and New Haven, but not in the factories of
Detroit and the mines of West Virginia.”77 Quoting the language of
Judge J. Skelly Wright in the Calvert Cliffs decision, he asked:
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests
are affected, ‘important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls
of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
federal bureaucracy?’ Of course it does—and a good thing, too.
Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals or minorities is in
question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or
misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. . . . The ability to lose or
misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime engines of social
change, and the prohibition against such carelessness is (believe it
or not) profoundly conservative. Sunday blue laws, for example,
were widely unenforced long before they were widely repealed—
and had the first not been possible the second might never have
78
occurred.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
See Scalia, supra note 10.
See id. at 896.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 897 (emphasis in original).
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Congress, however, had a profoundly different vision in mind
when it incorporated citizen-suit provisions into the environmental
laws. Indeed, the fact that Congress also authorized awards of
attorneys fees to successful citizen litigants demonstrates that it
viewed citizen suits and enforcement of the environmental laws to be
79
highly desirable and in need of encouragement. The Senate Report
on the Clean Water Act citizen-suit provision states that “[c]ourts
should recognize that in bringing legitimate actions under this section
citizens would be performing a public service and in such instances,
the courts should award the costs of litigation to such party.”80 Thus,
Congress clearly contemplated that citizen enforcement actions were
a necessary supplement to suits by government authorities against
private parties who violate the provisions of the Act.81
Standing doctrine should not be manipulated to serve as an
obstacle to enforcement of laws that certain members of the judiciary
82
view with disfavor. In setting up a regulatory framework with broad
based environmental goals and mechanisms for citizen enforcement,
Congress intended to supplant the common law framework with a
regime that recognized the public nature of environmental harm, and
the accompanying interest of citizens to enforce the laws as
“representatives of the public.” According to the Senate committee
report on the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act, “citizens
should be unconstrained to bring these actions”, and “the courts
should not hesitate to consider them.”83 Thus, legislative history
clearly demonstrates that Congress meant for citizens to be able to
enforce the environmental laws when government authorities failed
to pursue violators.
Each time it has reauthorized the environmental laws, Congress
has strengthened their enforcement provisions and reaffirmed its
support for citizen suits as a supplement for government enforcement.
This is reflected in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which
79. See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in
Public Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1984).
80. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 75 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747.
81. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Congress
made clear that citizens groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as
welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests.”).
82. See Jonathan Poisner, Comment, Environmental Values and Judicial Review after
Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335,
401 (1991) (stating that the Court’s rejection of public values as a basis to bring suit “denigrates
citizenship and the concept of altruism”).
83. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746. This language is
also part of the Senate Report on the Clean Air Act, S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 37 (1970).
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responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.84 by amending the citizensuit provision to make it easier to bring citizen suits in the wake of
this decision. In Gwaltney the Court held that the “alleged to be in
violation” language of the Clean Water Act’s citizen-suit provision
barred suits for violations that had been cured at the time the lawsuit
was filed. In the 1990 Amendments, Congress replaced the same
“alleged to be in violation” language contained in the Clean Air Act
with the phrase “alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the
alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in violation,” allowing
citizen suits for repeated past violations.85
B. The Return to a Private Law Model of Standing
In 1982, the Supreme Court had consolidated the requirements
for standing which had been developed by the Court in the 1970s and
which would become the basis for modern standing doctrine. In
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
86
Church and State, the Court determined that
at an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes
the court’s authority to “show [1] that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant,” and [2] that the injury “fairly can be
traced to the challenged action” and [3] “is likely to be redressed by
87
a favorable decision.”

In addition to these constitutional requirements of injury in fact,
traceability, and redressability, the Court also added the fourth
“prudential” requirement, articulated in Data Processing, that the
injury is to an interest arguably within “the zone of interests” to be
88
protected by the statute the defendant allegedly violated.
As the Court began to apply this test in environmental cases, it
began to limit the ability of plaintiffs to sue to prevent environmental
harms. In the process, the Court adopted a model of standing
grounded on individualized notions of injury and causation that made
it more difficult for plaintiffs in environmental law cases to bring
citizen suits. A study of citizen enforcement under the federal
environmental laws conducted in 1984 by the Environmental Law
84. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
85. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994).
86. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
87. Id. at 472 (internal citations omitted).
88. See id. at 474-75 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 n.12 (1970)).
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Institute found that environmental groups then believed standing
requirements to be a “non-issue” in citizen enforcement actions.89
During the 1990s, however, environmental groups came to consider
standing to be one of the most significant barriers to citizen actions to
enforce the environmental laws.90 As a result of Supreme Court
decisions adopting a more restrictive vision of citizen standing, some
lower federal courts required plaintiffs to make exceedingly
particularized showings of causation and harm in order to
demonstrate standing.
91
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, decided in 1990, the
Court began to place geographical limitations on the ability of users
of environmental areas to sue. In this case, the National Wildlife
Federation challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s decision to
reclassify thousands of acres of public lands, thereby opening them up
92
to mining activities that could hamper the natural environment.
Members of the group alleged that they recreated in areas “in the
93
vicinity” of the areas to be opened up to mining. The Court held
that this allegation was insufficient to confer standing on the
plaintiffs, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to show use of the
94
specific areas where mining would be allowed.
In refusing to confer standing on a citizen who alleged use of
land “in the vicinity” of the lands on which the challenged activity
took place, the Court narrowed the scope of user standing set forth in
95
Sierra Club v. Morton. In addition to requiring use of an area, such
as hiking or camping, the Court’s decision in Lujan appeared to
require plaintiffs to prove that they actually carried out such activity
at the specific location where the challenged activities would take
place. This requirement was somewhat counterintuitive because it
required a citizen who is attempting to protect wilderness lands from
human encroachment to actually use those lands. Taking this test to

89. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES, V-30 (1984).
90. See John D. Echeverria & Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion of Citizen
“Standing” to Sue to Enforce Federal Environmental Law at 9 (Envtl. Policy Project,
Georgetown University Law Ctr., June 1999) (“For environmental advocates, the evolution of
standing doctrine over the last decade has been a case of heads we lose, tails they win.”).
91. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
92. See id. at 879.
93. See id. at 880.
94. See id. at 889. The Court held that the use of “unspecified portions of an immense tract
of territory” was not sufficient to confer standing.
95. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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its extreme might require a citizen to pitch a tent in the heart of a
roadless wilderness area in order to challenge the legality of decisions
that open the area to development.
Furthermore, this test appeared to be partially at odds with the
purpose of one of the laws allegedly violated in the case, the Federal
Land Policy and Management Policy Act (FLPMA). The Act favors
multiple use management, a management tool that recognizes that
lands must be managed for their ecological and environmental value
96
as much as they must be managed for some human use. Thus, by
requiring the plaintiffs to actually use the area where the alleged
violation took place in order to establish an injury, the Court ignored
the goal of the statute under which the suit was brought.97
Furthermore, the Court set a difficult use standard for those wishing
to challenge actions occurring on wilderness lands.
The case that confirmed the most significant shift toward a
98
private law model of standing was Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
decided by the Court in 1992. In this case, Defenders of Wildlife
challenged the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of a
regulation that excluded activities occurring outside of the United
States from the requirement that federal agencies consult with the
Secretary when making decisions that may destroy the critical habitat
of endangered species.99 As a result of this interpretation of the
Endangered Species Act, federal agencies funding foreign projects
were no longer required to consult with the Department of the
Interior even if their projects would jeopardize endangered species
and their habitats. To establish their standing to sue, two members of
the Defenders of Wildlife alleged that they had traveled to foreign
countries, had observed the habitat of several endangered species,
and intended to return to observe these species in the future.100 Both
members observed the endangered wildlife in areas where U.S.

96. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994). Section 1701(a)(8) of FLPMA states:
One primary goal of the statute provides that “public lands be managed in a way that
will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate,
will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will
provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will
provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use. . . .”
97. See Poisner, supra note 82, at 399 (noting that many environmental laws “serve to
advance values beyond mere human use”).
98. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
99. See id. at 559.
100. See id. at 563.
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agencies were funding projects that could have adversely affected the
species observed.101
While acknowledging that the desire to observe an animal
species was a cognizable interest for purposes of standing, the Court
nonetheless determined that the plaintiffs failed to allege an injury in
fact that was “imminent” because they failed to allege any “concrete
plans” to return to the site where they had observed the animals
102
In a opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the
before.
plaintiff’s theory that an “ecosystem nexus” should provide them with
standing.103 Under this theory, a person who uses part of a
“contiguous ecosystem” that is adversely affected by some agency
action would have standing even if she is not geographically
connected to the action or activity.104 In rejecting this theory, the
Court relied on its opinion in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
which required plaintiffs to actually use the affected area in order to
have standing to sue.105 More importantly, while acknowledging that
the purpose of the statute in issue, the Endangered Species Act, is to
conserve the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened
species depend, the Court nonetheless held that the purpose of
protecting ecosystems does not confer a right to sue upon “persons
who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the
unlawful action in question.”106 Thus, the Court rejected the primary
purpose of the law the citizens sought to enforce as a basis for
standing.
Following Lujan, several U.S. Courts of Appeal issued decisions
illustrating the potentially extreme consequences of using a private
law model of standing. In Public Interest Research Group of New
107
the Third Circuit
Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,
concluded that a citizens’ group lacked standing to sue a corporation
for violating the terms of its NPDES Clean Water Act permit because
scientific evidence demonstrated that the polluter’s discharge was not
causing harm to the waterway used by the plaintiffs.108 Thus, despite
the fact that the plaintiffs had stopped fishing and swimming and had

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id.
See id. at 564.
See id. at 565-66.
See id. at 565.
See id. at 565-66.
See id. at 566.
123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 121.
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stopped eating fish and drinking water from the waterway because of
their knowledge that an unpermitted pollutant was being discharged,
109
According to the court,
they nonetheless lacked standing to sue.
“knowledge that a corporation has polluted waters is an ‘injury’
suffered by the public generally” and is thus not sufficient to confer
standing absent an “actual, tangible injury to the River or its
immediate surroundings.”110 Furthermore, the court held that the
plaintiff’s ability to allege it would suffer an “imminent” injury was
limited by evidence which tended to show that the defendant’s
discharges were not harming the ecosystem.111 In Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,112 a panel of the Fourth Circuit
adopted a similar argument, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue a Clean Water Act violator because they failed to
present evidence demonstrating an “observable negative impact on
113
the waterways.”
The adoption of a “harm to the resource” requirement by both
the Third and Fourth Circuits created a high hurdle for citizen
plaintiffs seeking to sue to enforce the Clean Water Act. The Clean
Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters
regardless of whether the discharge actually can be shown to harm
the waterbody. Thus, by requiring plaintiffs to prove harm to the
114
resource these courts undermined the statutory purpose of the Act.
In shifting the focus of the standing inquiry from harm to the plaintiff
to harm to the resource, these courts failed to acknowledge that the
plaintiff’s interest in using the waterway may have been cognizably
injured despite a lack of detectable harm to the resource.
Furthermore, the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act
defines a “citizen” as “a person or persons having an interest which is
or may be adversely affected,” thus codifying the focus on harm to
115
By requiring specific evidence of adverse impacts to
the plaintiff.
the resource these lower courts required the parties to present
scientific evidence at the standing stage that has no bearing on the
ultimate issue to be determined in the case, whether the defendant
109. See id. at 115.
110. See id. at 121.
111. See id. at 122.
112. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
113. See id. at 113-114.
114. See Coplan, supra note 44, at 201 (“The Clean Water Act clearly intends to make such
violations enforceable immediately, and not only after proof of damage to the ecosystem
arises.”).
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994).
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violated the Clean Water Act by discharging a pollutant in violation
of its permit.116
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.,117
the Fifth Circuit was faced with the issue of whether a citizens group
had standing to sue a private party for violations of the Clean Water
Act. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged use of a lake which was located
“some 18 miles and three tributaries” downstream from the
118
defendant’s refinery. In questioning whether the lake was even part
of the same “waterway,” the court found that the waterway was “too
large to confer causation solely from the use of some portion of it.”119
By doing so, the court implicitly determined that the effects of illegal
discharges could not be felt 18 miles away, though they could be at a
distance 2-4 miles away.120 Although it is certainly true that chemicals
dissipate in water, this is hardly evidence that one who uses an area
more than 4 miles from a pollution source cannot be affected by it,
whether through fear of swimming in the water or an actual exposure
to contaminated water. The Court making this determination
asserted that it was not placing a mileage or tributary limit on
plaintiffs seeking to sue under the Clean Water Act. However, this
seems to be the practical effect of the court’s decision. Similarly, in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,121 a
Fourth Circuit panel argued that it was not imposing a tributary or
mileage limitation after finding that a citizens’ group lacked standing
because the river used by one of its members was four miles from the
source of the pollution.122 In Public Interest Research Group of New
123
Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., the Third Circuit relied on
the eight mile distance between the point of discharge and the portion
of the waterway used by the plaintiffs to determine that “the River

116. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 117-118 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“[t]oday’s holding sets courts up for the litigation of scientific facts as a matter of standing—
facts unnecessary to the ultimate questions presented in these cases”).
117. 95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996).
118. See id. at 359.
119. See id. at 361.
120. See id. at 361. The court cites by comparison to a case in which causation could be
inferred for standing purposes when the plaintiffs used the waterway two to four miles from the
source of the pollution. See id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 900 F.
Supp. 67, 75 (E.D. Tex. 1995)).
121. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999).
122. See id. at 115.
123. 123 F. 3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
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could not possibly have been affected” by the discharge of heated
wastewater.124
By requiring plaintiffs to establish a geographic nexus between
their use of an affected resource and the defendant’s alleged harm,
the courts added an element to the standing analysis that is neither
required by the Clean Water Act nor the case and controversy
requirement of Article III. Furthermore, in rejecting the “water flows
125
downstream” argument, the courts failed to acknowledge that
pollutants discharged into waterways can be transferred far from their
source, a problem which the Clean Water Act clearly sought to
address.
The redressability requirement, which played a minimal role in
early environmental standing decisions, began to play a decisive role
126
In Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
in standing analysis.
127
Environment, citizen plaintiffs brought suit against a private party
for failure to comply with reporting requirements for storage of toxic
and hazardous chemicals under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA).128 On the issue of
standing, the Court declined the opportunity to decide whether a
violation of reporting requirements would constitute a sufficient
injury in fact and instead concluded that the citizens lacked standing
to sue because their injury could not be redressed by a court
decision.129 Among other things, the Court held that any civil
penalties awarded would be deposited with the United States
130
Treasury and would thus not be payable to the plaintiffs. As such,
the penalties would not be a payment for the injury the plaintiffs
suffered individually, but would instead be a means of

124. See id. at 123. See also Informed Citizens United, Inc. v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d
375, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (denying standing to a plaintiff who owned property located “more
than a mile from the filled wetlands, next to which runs an unnamed tidal creek”).
125. See, e.g., Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 115 n.7 (determining that plaintiff’s reliance on the
theory that water flows downstream does not satisfy the fairly traceable element of standing);
Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 123 (finding that plaintiffs argument that water flows
downstream does not alone satisfy the injury in fact requirement); Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 361
(finding that the plaintiffs inference that injuries suffered downstream may be caused by
discharges upstream was not enough to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing).
126. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568 (1992). The heightened
importance of the redressability requirement began with Lujan. In that case, a plurality of the
Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate redressability. See id.
127. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
128. See id. at 86-87. The EPCRA’s citizen-suit provision is 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994).
129. See id. at 107.
130. See id.
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“vindicat[ing] . . . the ‘undifferentiated public interest’ in faithful
execution of EPCRA,” a means that does not satisfy the
131
redressability requirement for standing. In addition, the Court held
that injunctive relief could not redress an injury for past violations.132
In so holding, however, the Court clarified that injunctive relief could
remedy the alleged harm resulting from “a continuing violation or the
imminence of a future violation.”133
IV. THE LAIDLAW DECISION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
134
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. has helped bring standing
doctrine out of the shadow of private law by rejecting the notion that
plaintiffs must demonstrate specific harm from violations of discharge
standards in order to be able to establish standing. In Laidlaw, the
Supreme Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that had held that
a Clean Water Act citizen suit had become moot when the defendant
came into compliance after the litigation had commenced. In 1992
Friends of the Earth (FOE) filed a Clean Water Act citizen suit
against Laidlaw, a company that owned a hazardous waste
incinerator. The trial court ultimately found that the company had
violated its NPDES permit on 489 occasions between 1987 and 1995
and it imposed a civil penalty of $405,800. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s Steel Company decision, held
that the litigation had become moot because FOE had not appealed
the trial court’s denial of injunctive relief and because the civil
penalties were payable to the U.S. government and not to FOE.
In the Supreme Court, Laidlaw argued that FOE lacked standing
because it failed to demonstrate that it had suffered any continuing
injury that could be redressed by judicial action. The Court rejected

131. See id. at 106 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577). “Psychic satisfaction” is not an
adequate remedy according to the Court. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107. But see id. at 127
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that punishment or prevention of future harm can redress an
injury).
132. See id. at 109.
133. See id at 108. Several lower federal court decisions have applied this dicta to citizen
suits involving current violations. See San Francisco Baykeeper v. Vallejo Sanitation and Flood
Control Dist., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (“There is no question that Baykeeper
has standing to seek injunctive relief based on its claim of present and future violations.”);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 584, 585 (S.D.
Cal. 1998) (finding Steel Company to be distinguishable in terms of the redressability analysis
from a case involving present violations of an environmental statute).
134. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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135

this argument and upheld FOE’s standing to bring the action. On
the issue of injury in fact, the Court responded to the defendant’s
allegations that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any harm to the
environment by concluding that “[t]he relevant showing for purposes
of Article III standing, however, is not injury to the environment but
136
injury to the plaintiff.”
The Court determined that requiring a
showing of harm to the environment would “raise the standing hurdle
higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an
137
action alleging noncompliance.”
Thus, the Court implicitly
recognized that employing a private law model requiring proof of
individualized, causal injury would defeat the purposes of the
environmental laws.
The Court held that affidavits of FOE’s members who
maintained that they no longer recreated as frequently in the area
due to concerns about illegal discharges from the plant were sufficient
138
Citing Sierra Club v. Morton, the
to demonstrate injury in fact.
Court stated that “environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in
fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons
‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be
139
lessened’ by the challenged activity.” The Court distinguished the
allegations in Laidlaw from those found insufficient in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
concluding they were not “conclusory allegations” or “speculative
‘some day’ intentions to visit endangered species halfway around the
world,” but rather represented “reasonable concerns” about
discharges that affected their “recreational, aesthetic, and economic
interests.”140
Thus, an allegation that members of a plaintiff
organization who live near or use an area in proximity to illegal
discharges have changed their behavior as a result of reasonable
concerns about the discharges should be sufficient to satisfy the injury
in fact requirement.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Laidlaw decision is its
treatment of the redressability prong of standing doctrine. Citing the
135. See id. at 180-188.
136. See id. at 181.
137. See id.
138. The affidavits of the citizen-plaintiffs included one citizen who lived one-half mile from
Laidlaw’s facility and who used an area 3-15 miles from the facility, another who citizen lived
two miles from the facility, and another who canoed 40 miles downstream from the facility and
would canoe closer to the facility if it were not for his fear of the pollution. See id. at 181-82.
139. Id. at 183.
140. See id.
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deterrent effect of civil penalties, the Court rejected the notion that
because the money would be payable to the U.S. Treasury, FOE had
no injury that could be redressed by the payment of civil penalties.
The Court noted that all civil penalties have some deterrent effect
and that it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that civil
penalties would properly redress the plaintiff’s injuries “by abating
current violations and preventing future ones.”141
The Court distinguished its decision in Steel Company by noting
that the violation there had been cured by the time the citizen suit
had been filed. Thus, although the redressability prong of the
standing analysis appears as if it will be satisfied when ongoing
injuries are alleged, standing may be denied on redressability grounds
if the violator has come into compliance by the time the suit is filed.
The juxtaposition of Steel Company and Laidlaw actually may create
a very powerful incentive for violators to come into compliance soon
after they receive 60-day notice letters since they may defeat a
plaintiff’s standing if they comply before the citizen suit is filed.
V. THE IMPACT OF LAIDLAW ON CITIZEN SUITS
Any doubt that Laidlaw would halt the trend toward restricting
citizen standing in environmental enforcement actions was quickly
dispelled a month later when the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
142
In a
relied upon Laidlaw to reverse its Gaston Copper decision.
unanimous decision written by Chief Judge Wilkinson, the dissenter
in the Gaston Copper panel decision, the court upheld FOE’s
standing to bring a citizen suit based on the affidavits of its members
who live and recreate near a smelter that had repeatedly violated its
NPDES discharge permit.
The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision reflects an appreciation of
why it is inappropriate to apply a private law model of standing in the
context of enforcing the Clean Water Act. Chief Judge Wilkinson
noted that the Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act of
1972 was enacted in reaction to the failure of a water-quality based
approach to pollution control. “Whereas the previous scheme
required proof of actual injury to a body of water to establish a
violation, Congress now instituted a regime of strict liability for illegal
143
As the Chief Judge noted, Congress made
pollutant discharges.”
141. See id. at 187.
142. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir.
2000).
143. Id. at 151.
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this choice because a water-quality approach had proved “inadequate
in every vital respect” because of the difficulty in determining
144
precisely what discharges would be harmful. Discussing the injury
in fact requirement, the court noted that “this standard is one of kind
and not of degree” and that “the claimed injury ‘need not be large, an
145
identifiable trifle will suffice.’”
Applying these principles in light of Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit
had no difficulty in upholding the standing of the Gaston Copper
plaintiffs. The court noted that one plaintiff’s organization included a
member who “is a real person who owns a real home and lake in close
proximity to Gaston Copper” and that his “fears are reasonable and
146
not based on mere conjecture.” Citing Laidlaw, the court pointedly
rejected the suggestion that plaintiffs must demonstrate specific
changes in the chemical content of waterways or specific harms to the
ecosystem. Noting that “[t]hreatened environmental injury is by
nature probabilistic,” the court concluded that plaintiff’s member
“need not wait until his lake becomes barren and sterile or assumes
an unpleasant color and smell before he can invoke the protections of
the Clean Water Act.”147
Discussing the traceability requirement, the Fourth Circuit
explicitly rejected the notion that plaintiffs must demonstrate that
illegally discharged pollutants actually reached their property.
“Where a plaintiff has pointed to a polluting source as the seed of his
injury, and the owner of the polluting source has supplied no
alternative culprit, the ‘fairly traceable’ requirement can be said to be
148
fairly met.” Thus, plaintiffs were not required to provide chemical
analyses of the fate and transport of the discharge because this
“would necessitate the litigation of complicated issues of scientific
fact that are entirely collateral to the question Congress wished
resolved—namely, whether a defendant has exceeded its permit
limits.”149 The court reserved the question whether a different
conclusion would be made for plaintiffs “so far downstream that their
injuries cannot fairly be traced to” the polluter, noting that the

144.
3674).
145.
1996).
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
See id. at 156 (quoting Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir.
See id. at 157.
Id. at 160.
See id. at 162.
Id.
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plaintiffs’ members “sit squarely in the discharge zone of a polluting
facility. . . .”150
The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Gaston Copper indicates
that Laidlaw has helped restore common sense to the interpretation
of standing requirements in environmental citizen suits. The court
expressly rejected the imposition of detailed requirements for
demonstrating individualized, causal injury in such actions,
recognizing that they would defeat the purposes of the statutes these
actions are designed to help enforce. The court noted:
An important reason for Congress’ shift to end-of-pipe standards
was to eliminate the need to address complex questions of
environmental abasement and scientific traceability in enforcement
proceedings. To have standing now turn on direct evidence of such
things as the chemical composition and salinity of receiving waters
would throw federal legislative efforts to control water pollution
into a time warp by judicially reinstating the previous statutory
regime in the form of escalated standing requirements. Courts
would become enmeshed in abtruse scientific discussions as
151
standing questions assumed a complicated life of their own.

In light of Laidlaw and Gaston Copper, standing requirements in
environmental citizen suits now can be met through use of
“circumstantial evidence such as proximity to polluting sources,
predictions of discharge influence, and past pollution,” which may be
152
used to prove injury in fact and traceability.
Dissenting in Laidlaw, Justice Scalia argued that the majority
“makes the injury in fact requirement a sham. If there are permit
violations and a member of a plaintiff environmental organization
lives near the offending plant, it would be difficult not to satisfy” the
153
majority’s standard. Concurring in Gaston Copper, Judge Hamilton
expressly agreed with Justice Scalia’s view, observing that Laidlaw
“has unnecessarily opened the standing floodgates. . . .”154 While
joining the Fourth Circuit’s unanimous en banc opinion in Gaston
Copper, Judge Niemeyer decried Laidlaw as having worked “a sea
change in constitutional standing principles.”155
Has Laidlaw really effected such a profound transformation in
this area of constitutional law? Although it certainly appears to have

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See id.
Id. at 163.
Id.
528 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See 204 F.3d at 165 (Hamilton, J., concurring in the judgment).
See 204 F.3d at 163 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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worked an abrupt change in the way in which some lower courts are
applying standing doctrine, this may be a product of the extreme
manner in which some members of these courts had been applying
restrictive conceptions of standing founded on a private law model
insisting on individualized proof of causal injury. While Justice Scalia
clearly had been pushing standing doctrine in this direction, even in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, two members of his 6-Justice
majority—Justices Kennedy and Souter—indicated that they would
have upheld the plaintiffs’ standing had they simply purchased airline
tickets or announced a definitive date to return to the sites where
endangered animals allegedly were threatened.156 This is a far cry
from requiring plaintiffs to make detailed demonstrations of causal
injury that approach common law tort standards.
Now that Laidlaw has confirmed that such detailed showings are
unnecessary, standing once again may be founded on proximity to, or
use of resources, as had been understood following Sierra Club v.
Morton. This will not prove to be a great hurdle for environmental
plaintiffs to satisfy. Indeed, the application of more restrictive
standing rules probably did more to raise the cost of Clean Water Act
litigation than it did to reduce the number of citizen suits. A 1995
analysis of citizen actions brought under the Clean Water Act
revealed that the number of citizen suits filed under the Act had
increased through 1993, with citizen-suit enforcement “nearly
equal[ing] all CWA judicial enforcement efforts brought throughout
157
the nation by all the states and the federal government combined.”
158
The trend appeared to continue through the late 1990s.
For
example, in 1997 and 1998 the number of Clean Water Act citizensuit complaints that resulted in consent decrees nearly equaled the
159
number of EPA civil judicial settlements reached in those years.
156. See 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157. See Hodas, supra note 70, at 1620. Hodas’ data was based on citizen 60-day notices
maintained by the EPA Office of Water Enforcement. See id. at Table 1.
158. According to Hodas’ table, the following number of CWA notices were sent to EPA:
1990 - 200, 1991 - 177, 1992 - 189, 1993 - 300. According to data maintained by the EPA Water
Enforcement Division, Office of Regulatory Enforcement, the following CWA notices were
sent to EPA during the period from 1995-1998: 1995 - 108, 1996 - 395, 1997 - 318, 1998 - 125. See
Letter from Donald M. Olson, Chief, Industrial Enforcement Branch (January 2000) (on file
with authors). The data does show several deviations, with lower numbers of notices filed in
1995 and 1998.
159. See ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 73, at 92; Letter from
Donald M. Olson, Chief, Industrial Enforcement Branch (January 2000) (on file with authors).
In 1997, consent decrees were reached in 38 citizen actions under the Clean Water Act. In that
same year, EPA reached 35 civil settlements. In 1998, consent decrees were reached in 26
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Citizen suits brought under other statutes also increased in numbers
in the 1990s, despite more restrictive interpretations of standing. The
160
enhanced availability of monitoring data, permit information, and
the implementation of the Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act may help explain the continued upward trend in
the number of citizen suits in the 1990s. An analysis of case law from
the 1980s and 1990s revealed that the number of suits brought
pursuant to the citizen-suit provisions of the major environmental
statutes may have doubled from the 1980s to the 1990s.161
Laidlaw probably will have little impact on the number of citizen
suits brought, though it should reduce the time and expense of
litigating them. Fears that liberalized standing will lead to more
citizen suits being brought for trivial violations of the environmental
laws ignore the important role that courts play in determining the
appropriate penalties for violations. If violations that are truly trivial
become the targets of citizen suits, courts are fully capable of
adjusting the penalties imposed for them to trivial levels.
Environmental groups have scant incentive for filing citizen suits that
will accomplish little in terms of improving environmental protection.
It is noteworthy that in cases like Laidlaw and Gaston Copper, battles
over environmental standing were waged by the defendants largely to
escape having to pay large penalties for hundreds of significant
violations that occurred over periods of several years.

citizen actions. In the same year, EPA reached 33 civil settlements. One caveat to this data is
that EPA enforcement data is recorded by fiscal year, while the data on citizen enforcement is
recorded by calendar year.
160. See CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT: TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION, EPA 315-B98/010, November 1998, at 4-5. One of the central goals of EPA’s Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance (OECA) is to expand citizens’ right to know about their environment.
In fiscal year 1998, the EPA developed several new internet-based programs to provide
information to the public. See ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 73 at
at 18-20.
161. This was determined through a general Westlaw search on the citizen-suit provisions of
the major environmental statutes: the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g); Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994); and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,
42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994). This search did not differentiate between citizen enforcement actions
and citizen suits challenging government activity. A search of appellate decisions involving
citizen standing under these statutes also showed that the number of cases doubled.
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By focusing the injury in fact inquiry on whether the members of
plaintiff environmental organizations had “reasonable concerns”
about the effects of illegal pollutant discharges, Laidlaw returns
environmental standing to a focus on the risk of threatened harm.
Justice Scalia’s campaign to require more definitive demonstrations
of actual or imminent harm as a predicate for standing undermined
the very purpose of environmental regulation—to require dischargers
to adhere to standards designed to prevent harm before it occurs.
Adopting standing rules that would preclude citizen suits until illegal
discharges have resulted in actual or visible harm would be
inconsistent with the purpose of citizen-suits provisions. While
defendants in citizen suits now may try to challenge the
reasonableness of plaintiffs’ concerns, only in very rare cases should it
be possible to demonstrate that concerns about the effects of nearby,
163
substantial, illegal discharges are unfounded.
Perhaps the most significant result of Laidlaw is its repudiation
of the extreme lengths to which Justice Scalia was pushing the
redressability prong of standing doctrine. The majority’s receptivity
to Congress’s judgment that imposition of civil penalties will deter
164
future violations is a welcome departure from recent decisions
rejecting the adequacy of legislative findings supporting regulatory
initiatives in areas as diverse as the effect of development on coastal
165
166
erosion, traffic congestion, the substantiality of the effect on
interstate commerce of gun possession near schools167 or violence
against women.168 In contrast to Justice Scalia’s skepticism of
legislative findings, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Laidlaw
states that Congressional findings that civil penalties deter future
163. Cf. Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992) (holding that 22
property owners could not recover for the diminution in their property values due to their
proximity to a dumpsite leaking toxic chemicals because it was impossible that the contaminants
actually would migrate to their property given the existence of a hydrogeological barrier
between their property and the contaminant plume).
164. The Court majority observes that “it is reasonable for Congress to conclude that an
actual award of civil penalties does in fact bring with it a significant quantum of deterrence over
and above what is achieved by the mere prospect of such penalties.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186.
While Justice Scalia argues in dissent that deterrence is not specifically mentioned in § 309(d) of
the Clean Water Act as a factor to be considered in determining civil penalties, this argument is
curious given that the factors that are mentioned in this section (economic benefit of the
violation, history of violations, economic impact of the penalty on violator) are relevant
primarily to whether the penalty is adequate to deter the offender.
165. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
166. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
167. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
168. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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149

violations “warrants judicial attention and respect.” The extent to
which the Court will respect legislative judgments concerning the
relationship between regulated activities and the harm sought to be
prevented remains a crucial factor in future battles over
environmental regulation.
While the Laidlaw Court’s attempt to distinguish Steel Company
is unpersuasive, the distinction the two cases draw between citizen
suits filed before a violator has come into compliance and citizen suits
filed afterwards may make notice of violations letters uniquely
powerful tools for encouraging compliance. As a result of the
juxtaposition of Steel Company and Laidlaw, a violator who receives
a 60-day notice letter knows that if he comes into compliance before
the citizen suit is filed he will be able to defeat the plaintiffs’ standing,
but that if he does not do so he will be unable to escape civil penalties
even if he later complies.
In a concurring opinion in Laidlaw, Justice Kennedy signaled a
willingness to question the constitutionality of citizen suits on Article
II grounds. “Difficult and fundamental questions are raised when we
ask whether exaction of public fines by private litigants, and the
delegation of Executive power which might be inferable from the
authorization, are permissible in view of the responsibilities
committed to the Executive by Article II” to take care that the laws
170
This suggestion, which Justice Scalia cites
be faithfully executed.
with approval in his dissent,171 may presage a new constitutional
challenge to citizen suits. However, this concern is particularly ironic
in light of the federal government’s continued support for citizen suits
in Laidlaw and other environmental cases. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s
charge that the Laidlaw decision has “grave implications for
democratic governance”172 has it backwards—citizen suits actually
have worked well to promote principles of federalism and separation
of powers and to empower citizens to seek redress for official failures
to carry out the democratically expressed will of Congress.
Justice Scalia’s continued hostility toward citizen suits and the
underlying environmental laws whose enforcement they authorize is
reflected in his dissent in Laidlaw when he asserts that the citizen-suit
provisions of the Clean Water Act are used to “regularly and

169.
170.
171.
172.

See 528 U.S. at 185.
Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 209 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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173

notoriously” enforce the Act. Yet the facts of Laidlaw and the
track record of some state enforcement agencies,174 illustrate the
importance of providing citizens with a mechanism for redressing
significant environmental violations neglected by government
officials. Only when Laidlaw received a notice of a citizen suit did it
approach state authorities and ask to be sued over its violations.
While Laidlaw’s sole purpose was to avoid the citizen suit, something
Justice Scalia apparently deems admirable,175 if citizen suits were
unconstitutional, there would have been no impetus for the company
to have come into compliance.
Citizen enforcement can serve as a valuable supplement to
government efforts by allowing for the devotion of more attention to
176
local and regional concerns. Local citizens know best the conditions
of their local resources and may be in a better position than the states
or the federal government to bring enforcement actions.177 When
arguing before the en banc Fourth Circuit as an amicus in support of
citizen standing in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp.,178 a Department of Justice lawyer was asked why the
federal government chose not to prosecute the defendant. He
responded that local residents are better informed about local
conditions than federal officials.

173. In Laidlaw, South Carolina environmental officials did not take enforcement action
against the company’s notorious environmental violations until the company approached the
state and asked to be sued in order to preclude the citizen suit. The state agreed on the
condition that the company would prepare all the papers and even pay the filing fee for the
action against itself. The trial court ultimately rejected this gambit on the ground that it did not
constitute the kind of “diligent prosecution” required to preclude a citizen suit. See id. at 177
n.1, 186 n.2.
174. For example, a state legislative audit in Virginia found “major deficiencies” in the
state’s enforcement policies, including the fact that in fiscal year 1996 the state collected only a
total of $4,000 in civil penalties for Clean Water Act violations under a long-standing policy that
the state will not even seek to recoup from violators the economic benefit of violations. See
JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE DEQ, 119-120 (1996).
175. Justice Scalia apparently finds it admirable that Laidlaw went to the state to seek
preclusive suit—he analogizes this to a prisoner helping the authorities by confessing. See id. at
211 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A more appropriate analogy might be to a violator seeking a
pardon from a corrupt executive and offering to draft the pardon papers and pay the costs of
printing them.
176. See Hodas, supra note 70, at 1655.
177. See CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT, supra note 160, at 1. See also Hodas, supra note 70, at
1654 (arguing that citizens may be in a better position than government inspectors to discover
unpermitted discharges because companies may be discharging “at odd hours in hidden
locations”).
178. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999).

I - ESCAPING THE COMMON LAW’S SHADOW - PERCIVAL.DOC

Fall 2001]

ESCAPING THE COMMON LAW’S SHADOW

04/25/01 9:34 AM

151

Laidlaw’s recognition that standing can be premised on a
citizen’s relationship to a resource and her concerns over how illegal
activity may change it helps to remove citizen suits from the shadow
of the common law’s focus on private injuries. However, as other
179
commentators have noted, the Court’s apparent commitment to the
“injury in fact” prong of its current standing doctrine indicates that
the Court has not fully embraced the implications of a public law
model of standing. Plaintiffs still will have to establish that their
relationship to a resource is sufficiently close to qualify them to
enforce laws designed to protect that resource. Proximity to, or prior
use of, a resource are not bad proxies for establishing such a
relationship. Except in cases involving truly remote wilderness areas,
a fair case can be made that if no one who has used, lives, works or
recreates near a resource wants to join an enforcement action to
protect it, perhaps the litigation should not be pursued. Communitybased environmental groups should have no problem establishing
standing to sue violators who pollute local resources in light of
Laidlaw. These groups should understand the importance of
protecting natural resources in their communities.180 Citizens who live
near or use an area that is in the discharge zone of a pollution source
should have a sufficient relationship with the local resources to
establish standing to vindicate public environmental interests.
Laidlaw has clarified that the proper showing for injury in fact is
harm to the plaintiff and not harm to the environment. Thus, it will
not be necessary for a plaintiff to prove demonstrable harm to the
resource as a result of the defendant’s alleged violation. Rather, the
plaintiff must prove only that her proximity to the pollution or area
threatened by development has or would diminish her use and
enjoyment of the resource.
181
As established in Sierra Club v. Morton, a plaintiff’s use of an
area where a violation of law is allegedly occurring should be
sufficient to demonstrate that he or she is adversely affected for

179. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Litigation After Laidlaw, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,516 (2000) (noting the inherent tensions between the “injury in fact” requirement of current
standing doctrine and the purposes of enforcing public law).
180. David Bolling encourages citizens groups to monitor their local resources, obtain
reports, and if necessary sue the alleged violators under the citizen-suit provisions. See DAVID
M. BOLLING, HOW TO SAVE A RIVER 159 (1994). The book describes the requirements for
standing in a Clean Water Act citizen action as follows: “if you can demonstrate that you fish,
swim, boat, or otherwise regularly and currently use the river at the affected site, you probably
have standing to sue.”
181. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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182

standing purposes. In citizen suits challenging actions on wilderness
lands, past use of specific parcels should not be required. Rather,
plaintiffs should only be required to demonstrate that they have
visited some part of the allegedly affected area.183
It is not necessary for a citizen to live in the area in order to be
adversely affected by the violation. Citizens who do not live in an
area but who use or recreate in an area have a sufficiently
184
demonstrated injury in fact. It is clear, however, that those who live
close to the problem or who use the resource on a more frequent
basis may have suffered a more serious injury from the violation and
will also have the best knowledge of the problem. Furthermore,
current users as well as those who wish to enjoin the activity so that
they may use the resource again in the future have alleged a sufficient
injury in fact.185 This means that citizens who have stopped their use
because of their concern over a violation are still injured for standing
purposes.186 As one district court aptly and concisely stated, if a
plaintiff uses the area allegedly affected by the violation, plans to use
it in the future, but the defendant’s activity has diminished his use and
enjoyment she should have standing to sue.187 Thus, although factors
such as frequency and timing of use may be considered, these factors
should not be a limiting factor if use of the resource is demonstrated.
It is clear from both Supreme Court precedent and the language
of the authorizing environmental statutes that threatened injuries are
sufficient to establish injury in fact. Thus, as Laidlaw confirms,
citizen plaintiffs are not required to wait for resources to suffer visible
harm. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that she has reasonable concerns
or fears arising from the challenged activity, this should be sufficient
182. See id. at 739-40.
183. Some would argue they need not visit the area at all. According to Aldo Leopold, “[t]o
those devoid of imagination, a blank place on the map is a useless waste; to others, the most
valuable part. Is my share in Alaska worthless to me because I shall never go there?” ALDO
LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 294 (1949).
184. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 751-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Those who hike the
Appalachian Trail into Sunfish Pond, New Jersey . . . or who canoe and portage the Quetico
Superior in Minnesota, certainly should have standing to defend those natural wonders before
courts or agencies, though they live 3,000 miles away.”).
185. In economic terms, this interest in future use is like “option value” which a citizen is
willing to pay for future use. See Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic
Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1996).
186. See 528 U.S. at 184 (finding that “we see nothing ‘improbable’ about the proposition
that a company’s continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would
cause nearby residents to curtail their recreational use . . . and would subject them to other
economic and aesthetic harms”).
187. See, e.g., Stone v. Naperville Park Dist., 38 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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for standing purposes.
This is consistent with the framework and
purpose of environmental law, which is designed to overcome the
deficiencies of the common law by regulating multiple sources of
diffuse risks to prevent harm before it occurs rather than requiring
after-the-fact proof of individualized causal injury.
VI. CONCLUSION
By specifying that citizens with reasonable concerns about
environmental violations occurring near where they live, work or
recreate have standing to sue violators, the Laidlaw decision helps
remove standing doctrine from the shadow of the common law. The
decision makes standing analysis more consistent with the purposes of
environmental law, which seeks to prevent harm from multiple
sources of diffuse risk by regulating emissions that escape the
common law’s reach. Laidlaw repudiates Justice Scalia’s campaign to
bar citizens from enforcing the environmental laws by clarifying that
individualized proof of imminent, tort-like causal injury is not a
prerequisite for suing violators. Rather than threatening “democratic
governance,”189 Laidlaw empowers citizens to ensure that politically
powerful interests will not be able to pollute their neighborhoods in
violation of environmental standards. It will reduce the cost of
litigating citizen suits, which play an important role in supplementing
government enforcement of environmental law, particularly in
situations where citizens are in a better position to appreciate the
effects of local pollution problems.
In Laidlaw, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor and Chief Justice
Rehnquist abandoned Justice Scalia’s campaign to restrict citizen
standing. Justice Kennedy had foreshadowed his unwillingness to
follow Justice Scalia’s quest all the way to its most extreme
destination. In his concurring opinion in Lujan he observed that “[a]s
government programs and policies become more complex and farreaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of
190
action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.”
Justice Kennedy went on to observe that “Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to

188. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (finding that “reasonable concerns” about the effects of
the defendant’s alleged discharges were sufficient to establish injury in fact); Sierra Club v.
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1996).
189. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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a case or controversy where none existed before . . .” Yet Laidlaw
is significant precisely because it did not involve any newly-created
federal right of action or any newly-defined injury. Rather the Court
recognized the extreme consequences of basing standing on a
common law model of injury that would preclude citizens living and
recreating near the site of environmental violations from subjecting
repeat violators to substantial civil penalties. Laidlaw removes citizen
suits from the shadow of the common law, reflecting a welcome
appreciation of the precautionary purposes of federal environmental
regulation.

191. Id.

